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I
In the current United Kingdom technology
curriculum, 'values'  are usually put in what
might be described as technicist commercial
terms.  The argument [as such it is] for' values'
often runs thus:
For an artefact to have any value it must
be well made and attractive: vital aspects
of  commercial production [sic] that can
only be achieved by the teaching of
practical skills and the grasping of cross-
curricular themes such as economic and
industrial understanding...1
In the commercial world, things  are valued
because they  lead to the promotion or
attainment of some further specific desired
end; they are instruments in the attainment
of those ends, and are valued  on that account.
Seen in this light, the value of most
commercially manufactured artefacts  is simply
instrumental i.e. merely a means towards
some other end.  That, for example, a Ford
Fiesta, coming off the the assembly-line has
no  value in itself either for the producer or
consumer, is evidenced by the fact that if it
fails post-production inspection then unless
the fault can be rectified within 3 minutes of
post-production time, the vehicle is simply
scrapped and re-ordered on to the production
line.
Again, commercial production processes
themselves are simply among of the means
[because that's what the vehicle after all only
exists for as far as the producer or shareholder
is concerned] of turning the artefact into a
profit. If the artefact ceases to be commercially
viable then the processes that contributed to
its production are similarly otiose unless they
can be turned to the production of other
artefacts, again of  instrumental value.2  Indeed,
the UK National Curriculum in technology
tends to focus  on such instrumentalities;  we
note that, for example 3
Pupils should be taught...to obtain and
analyse worthwhile and valid information
to develop their design approach and
establish the preferences of potential
users; eg use a questionnaire to determine
preferences concerning colour, comfort in
terms of temperature and humidity, and
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acceptable prices for an item of protective
clothing.
 It is not that learning to do such things is not
useful; quite obviously, it is. But there is often
little attempt to relate such instrumentalities
or means, [in curriculum terms] to the wider
ends to which techno-scientific activities may
ultimately relate. The curriculum activity tends
to be premised on notions such as '
preferences of potential users'. The
technology is seen as an instrument aimed at
the satisfaction of such preferences. These,
together with 'consumers' values' tend to be
taken as suitable 'ends'. We read, in another
example that pupils should be taught 4
...to understand that account needs to be
taken of the values of consumers by
examining existing products [to]...design
products for particular users with due
regard for their needs and values [and]
...identify the needs and preferences of
users reflected in existing products; eg
cultural values.
The above considerations tempt us towards
what I think are  two rather unsatisfactory
conclusions: on the one hand it seems that
'technology' is itself a 'value-neutral'
instrument whose function is merely to
provide society with  goods or artefacts; on
the other, it seems that  the question of what
is 'valuable' in these goods or artefacts is
cashed out in consumerist terms [it's simply
whatever the 'customer' wants].
Now of course, we may want to say here, that
whatever is of value in our techno-scientific
culture must surely be more deeply rooted
than this suggests, and indeed, I think this is
so; but we are hard put to find any clear
evidence of this in the current technology
curriculum. If you read the documentation
relating to it, you'll find it mostly refers to
'technology' and 'values' in the above terms.
So- what's gone wrong? Clearly, these
assumptions need to be challenged if
technology itself is to be seen as a significantly
worthwhile activity in curriculum terms, and
if the outcome of technological endeavour is
to be credited with anything other than
superficial value.
II
It is commonly held that technological
knowledge is concerned, like its close
neighbour scientific knowledge, with matters
of fact about the world. Technology and
science both aim at objectivity;  that is,
knowledge of the way things objectively are
in the world; with what can be stated as in
some sense 'factual' or 'true'. Such knowledge,
it is often assumed, is unproblematically value-
free, or at least can be distinguished from value
considerations with a clarity sufficient to
render its objective or factual status distinct
from value considerations. Now  there is
undoubtedly a lot of common sense in this
assumption.  It appears to be a commonplace
fact about  the world in which we find
ourselves,  that scientific and technological
know-how deals with [for instance] empirical
investigations of the physical world;  that  the
behaviour of the physical world which such
investigations reveal can be described through
universal 'laws of nature', including [in a
technological context]  materials, machines
and systems;  that it employs powerful tools
of analysis such as mathematics; and that the
employment of such tools of analysis typically
yields useful [and usable] predictions about a
vast variety of objects within the techno-
scientific domain.
Such  tools are often taken as paradigms of
investigative processes, rationality and
objectivity, their employment typically leads
to highly successful manipulation of the
physical environment, and the allusion is
usually to those aspects of the techno-
scientific framework  such as physics,
engineering,  chemistry and so on. However,
the techno-scientific framework is far less
homogeneous than this  implies. 'Objectivity'
and 'facts' may appear at least, to be relatively
unproblematic in physics, but are not so
obviously unchallengeable in other areas of
science; when, for example, one considers
areas of the social sciences such as economics
or psychology  [each of which might
legitimately lay claim to being considered a
part of the techno-scientific framework], it can
be argued that the methodological tools used
there are sufficiently different from those
employed in the 'hard' sciences and
technologies as to make notions of 'objectivity'
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more difficult to sustain.5  Notions such as
'facts' and 'objectivity' are really used rather
differently in these different domains; they
have a use which is relative to the different
methodologies which have become
established in those different domains. We
might say, following Wittgenstein 6 that
'objectivity' is a family resemblance concept,
and many different language-games can be
played with it. Notions of objectivity, fact,
rationality etc. have evolved along with the
techno-scientific framework, of which they are
inherently a part.  This need not detract from
their usability, but it serves to remind us that
the 'objectivity' of techno-scientific activity is
tied to the multiplicity of uses to which that
activity is put; it is not conferred upon it by
some higher authority. There is no
Archimedian point to which notions of
'objectivity' can be fixed. It is, therefore,
mistaken to assume that  technological
knowledge is 'objective' in the sense that it is
somehow independent  of the variety of
activities to which it is put.
We can challenge the supposed 'neutrality' of
technological knowledge in  another way;
some  things at least,  may be regarded as of
value in themselves - that is, they have intrinsic
value. We might for example, value certain
medical or surgical techniques for their
contribution to health or longevity; that is, as
instrumentally useful. But we would regard
good health as a good in itself; that is, as
intrinsically good.  Again, when we consider
medical technologies such as 'in vitro'
fertilisation we become aware that the pursuit
of of such technologies is premised upon
foundational assumptions about quality and
value in human life and experience [eg;
'parenthood', or 'the family'] ; these values are
'written in' to such activities. Although  we can
distinguish  between the technology itself and
the ends being pursued,  the technology
would seem to be pointless, even meaningless,
without these particular ends. The
supposition that it is a neutral value-free
process just awaiting application doesn't stand
up to scrutiny. Yet we frequently encounter
this kind of assumption in curriculum
technology literature. The U.K. National
Curriculum Council for example, has put
forward the view that7
Pupils will become aware of the ways in
which technology is changing the home,
the workplace and lifestyles, and they will
be better placed to respond to the
employment needs of business and
industry. They will learn that technological
change cannot be reversed and will
understand its enormous power and
realise that its use has to be controlled.
Note the apparent contradictions, ie, that
people on the one hand are seen as simply
required to "respond" to technology, yet on
the other hand somehow to "control" it, or
that such control apparently goes hand in
hand with the "irreversibility" of technological
change. Note also its apparent
depersonalisation; it is a 'neutral' technology
that changes "the home" rather than peoples'
actions, their values etc. themselves
influencing the nature and purposes of
technology.
 It is a common but mistaken assumption that
technology and science, as distinct forms of
knowledge, are 'objective' in the sense that
they are value-neutral, until directed to some
purpose or end [these purposes or ends being
value-orientated]. 'Pure' or 'objective' techno-
scientific activity in this sense is a myth; the
activity comes value-loaded. Values are
themselves intrinsically a part of  technological
processes.
III
To be objective is, it is assumed, to allude to a
domain of generally uncontested facts or
truths, whereas  to be subjective is to be tied
to individual  judgement and therefore fallible.
Again, this might be thought to have some
basis in common sense. Our individual
judgements seem more inclined to fallibility
than our collective judgements. The former,
it is said, lack the intersubjectivity of the latter.
The truth in this, is that although the latter
are intersubjective right enough, nothing
about the fallibility of the former follows from
this fact. My personal judgement may well be
correct in a given instance. In fact  if our
judgements as individuals  were not generally
reliable at least over commonplace matters in
the everyday conduct of our lives, then we
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would hardly be likely to survive. However, our
judgement, it is sometimes said,  is also
subjective in a different kind of way; it is
subjective with respect to our personal
preferences or values. I, for instance, may like
raspberry jam whereas you may not.  Now  my
preferring [or not] raspberry jam is not a fact
about the world but merely a fact  about me.
The trouble with this  reading of 'subjectivity'
is that it seems to lead straight to a  relativism
that is both  moral, and  aesthetic. Although
the facts we may claim to know about the
world may be subject to test, including the test
of intersubjectivity,  there  seems no way of
subjecting such preferences and values to any
test . They remain  'personal' and it thus seems
to follow that values rest simply with the
individual.  This kind of 'subjectivist' reading
of values seems implicitly a part of the
assumptions we find in the technology
curriculum, and is there, I think, because it
fits in rather well with the consumerism
underlying it. In short, it implies that values
issues, like preferences, may be addressed by
simple reference to consumer products. But
we need to dig deeper than this if we are to
avoid such trivialisation.  We need a more
adequate explication of the notion of 'value'.
Values are not like preferences; the latter can
[and do] frequently change. But values form
part of the relatively stable frame of reference
by means of which judgments can be made
and opinions and views can be expressed,
including of course, one's preferences
concerning, for example, consumer products.
Values form part of what we might call an
attitudinal framework. For example, I may
change my opinion about you, or come to
hold different beliefs concerning you. But such
changes take place against something deeper,
more fundamental - my attitude to you as
human being. That you are sentient, reflective,
feel pain, joy, anger, despair, love, etc. forms
part of this attitude. Without such a
framework, we could not so much as utter an
opinion, or form a belief, about  others [as
about much else]. Developing an opinion,
forming a belief, stating a preference etc.
depends upon a relatively stable attitudinal
framework against which these can develop
and form. Likewise, changing opinions, beliefs
etc. similarly  depend on such stability. Only
against a relatively stable background does it
become possible to assess changes of this
kind. We share this framework; it is our
common cultural and community heritage, so
to speak. This last point is important;  human
value systems are, like other  human practices,
rooted in communities. Such phenomena
depend logically, upon the existence of a
community. This, I think, has profound
implications; it means that the concept of
community is, in an important sense, an
essential dimension, in the development and
continuing evolution of such practices. We
owe the values we have as individuals to the
community; it is from thence that they spring.
This conclusion runs counter to the
psychological atomism implicit in the
technology curriculum's assumption of 'values'
cashed out  in terms of preferences which are
a matter mainly for the individual.
IV
I have argued for the inherent value-ladenness
of  technology, and for a conception  of values
as rooted - essentially so - in community
practices. This  links our techno-scientific
practices to the wider community, binding
them into a shared value-system. What are the
implications of this for an ethics of the
technology curriculum? Clearly, perceptions
there, of both of technology and  values, need
revision if this discussion is apposite; we need
a richer notion of both and these need to be
embedded in the curriculum in place of the
present rather impoverished assumptions.
These revisions would  have some impact on
both the content, and mode of delivery, of the
technology curriculum; I am not, of course,
advocating courses on 'ethics' to be
incorporated, but rather, for  a view of
technological activity that would be more
closely in accord with the conclusions I have
drawn here. One way of promulgating this
would be to focus more explicitly on
programmes of technological literacy, a
proposal I have discussed elsewhere.8  The
introduction of technological literacy
programmes of study into the curriculum
would involve developing in students an
appreciation of ways in which new meanings
are constructed, which itself grows out of an
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active striving towards new perspectives,  one
which aims to get the active engagement of
the individual in the creative processes
essential to the forming of constructively
critical perspectives through which meaning
comes to be infused into the techno-scientific
framework.
Technological literacy programmes might
broaden the current context  of the
technology curriculum to confront ethically
significant issues such as:
• The tensions between empowerment and
entrapment of the individual
• Conflicts between Individual and
organisational interests
• Difficulties of re-skilling
• Dangers of de-skilling
• Ideological debates and conflicts
• Conflicts over- and between- vested
interests.
Technological literacy programmes would
extend the curriculum more explicitly beyond
the  domain of the functional to give succinct
characterisation to the processes of growth
and evolution of the techno-scientific
framework as it interacts with - and is itself
shaped by - our community-based  value
systems.
